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ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN REPRESENTING
PUBLICLY-FUNDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
IN ENGLAND'S CROWN COURT
Peter W. Tague*
INTRODUCTION
The flux now engulfing the way in which the defenders of
indigent criminal defendants are compensated in England's
Crown Court provides a sober lesson for U.S. lawyers. Once,
U.S. lawyers, who themselves are appointed to represent indi-
gent defendants, could have cited English practice to support a
hefty increase in the meager compensation they receive in many
jurisdictions.1 For in balancing the tension between encourag-
ing effective representation, but at bearable social cost, U.S. ju-
risdictions stress the latter, all but ignoring the former.2 The
English approach, by contrast, has paid generously,3 at least in
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center, Washington, D.C.
1. For a comparison of the remuneration in England's Crown Court with that in
federal district court, see Peter W. Tague, Representing Indigents in Serious Criminal Cases
in England's Crown Court: The Advocates'Performance and Incentives, 36 AM. CriM. L. REv.
171, 220 (1999). In that article I examined, the fees paid to barristers and solicitors by
legal aid in 63 cases being taxed-that is, the compensation was being chosen-in the
Old Bailey, London's celebrated Crown Court for criminal cases, in 1992. The amounts
paid in cases considered serious (the subject of the study), even in 1992, would make
lawyers envious. For example, in a five-day trial of an uncomplicated robbery, the de-
fendant's Queen's Counsel received £5596, his junior £2934, and his solicitor £2,946,
for a total of £11,176 (or US$16,764, at £1 = US$1.50). A lawyer representing the same
defendant in federal court would have performed the work of the two barristers and
solicitor, and still received no more than US$3500, unless that cap on the overall fee
was pierced, an event that does not occur frequently. These fees, of course, far exceed
the amounts barristers received in cases lasting less than three days. The compensatory
schemes are described in more detail in Part I.
2. Many states pay little more than a pittance. Virginia, for example, recently in-
creased the payment to US$305 (from US$265) to represent criminal defendants
charged with crimes where the sentence is less than 20 years. ChiefJustice Rehnquist
has urged Congress to increase the compensation in federal courts, from US$65 for
time in court and US$45 for time out of court, because "compensation rates still do not
meet many attorneys' non-reimbursable overhead costs." Joan Biskupic, Rehnquist's
Year-End Report; ChiefJustice Urgently Requests Higher Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers, WAsH.
PosT, Jan. 1, 2000, at A2. He said nothing, however, about the US$3500 cap. See Crimi-
nal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2) (1982 & Supp.).
3. Remarkably, defending is currently compensated much more than prosecuting.
As independent contractors, barristers are briefed to prosecute and to defend (a barris-
ter can prosecute on Monday and defend on Wednesday). A study undertaken by the
Crown Prosecution Service (that pays barristers' fees for prosecuting) and the Bar
1128
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serious cases, thereby implicitly recognizing that defenders
could be induced by acceptable remuneration to represent indi-
gents and to do so effectively.4
Spiraling costs in England,5 however, have brought dra-
matic changes, and have occurred in a rush. One scheme, the
so-called ex-post facto method,6 in place for many years, was
scrapped inJanuary 1997. The replacement, 7 the "graduated fee
scheme," crafted through negotiations between the U.K. Govern-
ment and the Bar of England and Wales, was not designed to
reduce then current levels of compensation,' but to enable the
found that under the current scheme defending is paid 40% more than prosecuting,
across all cases covered by set fees (from one to ten trial days).
4. There are several possible reasons why fees are so much higher, at least in seri-
ous cases. For one, the Bar has had a monopoly over the right of audience (the right to
appear) in the Crown Court and appellate courts. This monopoly gave it tremendous
leverage in negotiations with the Lord Chancellor's Department over the fees to be
paid by legal aid. Moreover, the Lord Chancellor has always been a barrister, and thus
aware of the Bar's concerns, even as he tries to control expenditures. Also, because of
the so-called cab-rank rule, banisters cannot refuse a brief unless, among various rea-
sons, the fee is inadequate. But the Bar accepts that fees paid by legal aid are suffi-
cient-and this is so, no doubt, because the fees are generous, again at least in serious
cases and when judged by U.S. standards.
5. In the Crown Court (England's court of general jurisdiction) and appellate
courts the spending on criminal legal aid jumped 58% (to £349,000) over the five years
ending 1997-98, even though the number of cases remained the same (124,000). See
LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, MODERNISING JUSTICE: THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS
FOR REFORMING LEGAL SERVICES AND THE COURTS 60, 6.6 (1998) [hereinafter RE-
FORMING LEGAL SERVICES].
6. For an extended discussion of how this system operated, see Peter W. Tague, Ex
Post Facto Payments in Legally-Aided Criminal Cases in the Old Bailey, 28 ANGLO-AM. L. REV.
415 (1999).
7. See The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (Costs) (Amendment)
(No. 2) Regulations 1996, Legal Aid, S.I. 1996, No. 2655 (U.K.) [hereinafter 1996 Legal
Aid Regulations].
8. One aim, however, was to redistribute the allocation of money from Queen's
Counsel to junior barristers somewhat. For the difference between the two types of
barristers, see infra note 16. A junior's basic fee now depends upon the category of
offense with which the defendant is charged. With Class D sexual offenses, a junior's
basic fee is £446.50, which is for preparation and the trial's first day. He also received
two fees for each trial day after the first, a refresher-the standard term for the fee for
each succeeding trial day-and an uplift for each day. Under the former scheme, non-
ex post facto (or standard fee) cases were also paid a set amount, but it was the same no
matter the nature of the case. In 1995, the basic fee for a trial was £214, and £153 for
each trial day after the first. See The Legal Aid in Criminal Care and Proceedings
(Costs) Regulations 1989, Legal Aid, S.I. 1989, No. 343, Sched. 2 (U.K.). It is true,
however, that many rape defenses would have been regarded as special cases under the
old scheme, with a higher fee determined after the fact. The fees paid under the grad-
uated fee scheme are ostensibly not overly generous when compared to those in federal
courts. For example, the junior's basic fee in that Class D case, expressed as an hourly
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Lord Chancellor to control future increases in cost.
Yet this reform has apparently not proven sufficient. In the
White Paper, published in December 1998, the Lord Chancellor,
without elaboration, bemoaned "inappropriate" financial incen-
tives that resulted in unnecessary adjournments and delayed
guilty pleas.9 Rather than changing the graduated fee scheme to
re-channel those incentives, however, the Lord Chancellor is
proposing various innovations whose effect will be to limit the
defendant's right to select the solicitor and barrister, 10 and to
destroy the hoary tradition of having barristers, as independent
contractors, represent both the prosecution and defendant in
the Crown Court.i1 These changes include redistributing de-
rate, is £56 or US$84 (£1 = US$1.50) (£446/8, assuming three hours to prepare plus
five hours for the trial's first day). Under the old scheme, the hourly rate would sink to
£27 (£214/8) or US$41. But under the current scheme, the barrister is paid twice for
each succeeding trial day: a refresher of £145.50 and an uplift of £282. Hence, assum-
ing a two-day trial, the barrister would receive £1017.70 (£446.50 + £145.50 +£282) or
US$1518. In addition he would be paid £1.08 per page of prosecution evidence and
£7.14 per prosecution witness. Assuming the lawyer was compensated for the same
time-three hours to prepare plus five hours per trial day-his compensation, at US$75
per hour, would be US$975 (13 x US$75). Of course, the lawyer would take much
more time to prepare; but his extra preparation would be paid to the defendant's solici-
tor who undertook this work. Since the Crown Prosecution Service has not adopted the
graduated fee scheme, the barristers it briefs to prosecute in Crown Court, in non-ex
post facto cases, are paid less: £224 for a basic fee and £155 for each refresher. CROWN
PROSECUTION SERVICE, PROSECUTION COUNSEL FEES IN THE CROWN COURT 1 6 (1995). I
was told these fees have not changed.
9. See REFORMING LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 5, at 60-61, 1 6.7 (noting also that
cases are unnecessarily taken to Crown Court rather than adjudicated in magistrates'
court). The fees paid to barristers are much higher when the defendant pleads guilty
shortly before or as the trial begins (called a "cracked" trial) than if he does so at an
earlier stage. Thus, barristers have an incentive to delay negotiating a guilty plea until
the trial.
10. The Government presaged inroads into the defendant's ability to select the
barrister in the White Paper. It defended the "inevitabl[e] ... restriction on the unfet-
tered choice of lawyer the clients have under the current legal aid system" by asserting
that it was "necessary and desirable in order to secure quality and value for money."
REFORMING LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 5, at 63, 6.20. In truth, limits appear directed
more to solicitors than barristers. The Government intends to develop contracts with
solicitors' firms to provide the gamut of legal services in criminal cases. The purposes
are to control costs and to ensure quality (through monitoring of performance.) De-
fendants will be able to choose any solicitor from among those with a contract. See
LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, MODERNISING JUSTICE 10-11 (1998).
11. The Bar is alarmed about these possible changes but, in truth, its worry is prob-
ably exaggerated. From their publications and through my conversations with the Lord
Chancellor's Department and the Legal Aid Board, the Government intends to institute
a scheme of contracts for solicitors to undertake Crown Court (as well as Magistrates'
court) work by 2003. See CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICES, LEGAL AID FRANCHISE, INTRODUC-
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fense work by contract based on a fixed fee, 12 creating a public
defender system, and extending the right of audience (the right
to appear) in Crown Court to lawyers in the Crown Prosecution
Service.1 3
The recently revealed hefty fees paid to a few Queen's
Counsel has further fueled the Government's intent to reduce
expenditures in criminal-and family-legal aid.14 The Govern-
iNG CoNTRACrTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICES wITH LAWYERS IN PRIVATE PRAcrICE
(1999). Because solicitors can now qualify as advocates in Crown Court, it is possible
that some of these solicitors' firms will not retain a barrister to advocate in Crown
Court, but will do the advocacy themselves. With solicitors able to advocate in Crown
Court, the most efficient approach for the Government would be to pay the solicitor a
set amount to represent the indigent defendant, and let him decide whether to hire a
barrister or perform the advocacy by himself. If the former, then the solicitor would
negotiate a fee with the barrister, and pay him from the bulk amount received from
legal aid. Barristers worry about such an arrangement: their fees would probably drop
because solicitors could threaten to do the work themselves; solicitors might tarry in
paying the barrister's fee, creating the cash-flow problems that plague many barristers
in privately-funded cases. But the Government recognizes these problems, and appears
intent on paying directly any barrister who is briefed by the solicitor. A pilot project
creating several small public defender offices may begin soon, too. But even if these
offices succeed, the Government has no plan for public defenders to become the chief
supplier of defense advocacy, as in many jurisdictions in the United States. Instead,
public defenders will compete with solicitors and banisters to provide advocacy. That
is, so long as defendants remain able to choose the advocate, he or she could select
either the public defender or a solicitor, and, if a solicitor, a barrister to advocate (un-
less the defendant was satisfied to have the solicitor provide the advocacy). If public
defenders flourish, then they will grow no larger than providing 50% of the work in
legal aid cases, enough, of course, to draw considerable business from barristers and
solicitors.
12. Sobering descriptions of how lawyers fulfill their obligations under a contract
have not discouraged the Lord Chancellor from this legislative resolve. See Larry S.
Pozner, Life, Liberty and Low-Bid Lawyers: The Defiling of Gideon, CHAMPION, July 1999, at
9.
13. The Bar has fought this last innovation, now scheduled for implementation in
April 2000, on two grounds. The formal ground is that barristers must be independent
contractors, willing to represent either the prosecution or defense. Barristers or solici-
tors in the Crown Prosecution Service (in effect, a nation-wide prosecutorial office
whose lawyers heretofore acted as solicitors, preparing the prosecution's case to be de-
livered to a barrister to present in court) are salaried employees, and thus not in-
dependent contractors. The substantive reason was the claim that the person with ulti-
mate authority to dismiss the case, negotiate a guilty plea, or try the accusation ought to
be independent on the Government. The barrister is such a person; an employee of
the Government (the Crown Prosecution Service) is not.
14. The fees for the 20 barristers who received the most from legal aid in financial
year 1996-97 ranged from a low of £329,000-349,000 (for three barristers) to a high of
over £500,000 (for two barristers). Lord Chancellor's Department, Parliamentary Ques-
tion-Answer (drafted on Apr. 28, 1998). The figures are potentially misleading in that
part of the amounts could have been for work performed in preceding years because
the Lord Chancellor's Department keeps data on payments only for completed cases.
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ment now threatens to slash fees,' 5 and to bar Queen's Coun-
sel,16 who make the most money and are assumed to provide the
most able representation, from appearing in other than the most
serious cases. 17 Were Queen's Counsel to appear less frequently,
overall expenditures would likely be slashed,' 8 and fees paid to
juniors would not be as wildly out of balance as is the compari-
son between fees to lawyers and to Queen's Counsel. a9
Seemingly ignored by the Government in implementing
these changes in compensation is the way that such shifts can
alter the advocate's incentives to appear and to perform effec-
tively. 2° Here, the U.S. experience is instructive. Indigent de-
Nonetheless, the amounts are staggering, when compared to the remuneration in the
United States. For an analysis of the lucrative fees paid under the ex-postfacto scheme
when compared with those in federal court, see Tague, supra note 6. Assume that a
lawyer worked exclusively in a federal district paying the top hourly fee (US$75). For
50, 47-hour weeks, such a lawyer would earn US$175,000 (US$3500 [the cap on any
case]/75 = 47 hours per week; US$3500 x 50 = US$175,000).
15. See Frances Gibb, Barristers Pay Is Cut by £50m in Assault on Legal Aid, TIMES
(LONDON), Dec. 7, 1999, at 1 (proposing reduction in defense fees, now said to be £550
for two-day trial, to £375, amount received when prosecuting). The Bar would prefer to
rectify the imbalance between the fees paid to prosecute and to defend by raising the
former to the level of the latter. On the other hand, parity, together with a reduction in
expenditures, could as easily be achieved by lowering the fees to defend to the level of
fees to prosecute. But this would violate the Lord Chancellor's promise, when institut-
ing the graduated fee scheme, not to reduce the overall fees then paid to defenders.
16. Barristers are classified as Queen's Counsel or as juniors. The former, about
10% of all banisters, are chosen by the Monarch, on the advice of the Lord Chancellor,
supposedly on the basis of demonstrated skill as an advocate, after a minimum of 10
years of practice. All other barristers, no matter their age or experience, are known as
juniors. A junior's elevation to the status of Queen's Counsel brings prestige and
higher fees, even from legal aid. For a discussion, see PETER W. TAGUE, EFFEcTIvE ADVO-
CACY FOR THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT: THE BARRISTER Vs. THE LAWYER 20-21 (1996).
17. The Lord Chancellor's parliamentary secretary has said that only in "truly ex-
ceptional cases"-when the Crown's evidence consisted of at least 1000 pages or 80
witnesses-would the need exist for the defendant to be represented by a Queen's
Counsel. Loch Leads the Clampdown on Legal Aid QCs, SOLIc. J., Dec. 3, 1999, at 1131. If
that change were implemented, then it truly would be exceptional, because Queen's
Counsel now appear in cases that often appear routine to a lawyer. See part If(A), infra;
Tague, supra note 1.
18. It is estimated that 40% of legal aid expenditure for criminal defense is con-
sumed by one percent of the caseload. See CRIMINAL DEFENCE SERVICES, ENSURING QUAL-
fly AND CONTROLLING COST IN VERY HIGH COST CRIMINAL CASES 2.0 (1999). If in a
sizeable number of those cases juniors would appear rather than Queen's Counsel,
then the level of expenditure would obviously drop.
19. See Tague, supra note I (providing illustration of fees received by Queen's
Counsel); see also Criminal Care and Proceedings, supra note 7 (describing juniors'
fees).
20. The White Paper belies this point, but the Lord Chancellor neither explained
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fendants do not select the lawyer; 21 judges or court personnel
make these decisions instead. Even if the defendant had the
power his counterpart in the United Kingdom now does to
choose the lawyer, many lawyers would refuse the appointment.
Not bound by the cab-rank rule to represent any client who
seeks help, many able lawyers do not take appointments, discour-
aged by the very low fees. Those lawyers who do accept appoint-
ments are not encouraged by incentives to perform appropri-
ately. They are chosen whether they lack acuity or zealousness.
They are not rewarded for a stellar or efficient performance or
punished for a lackluster one. Nor do they need to respond to
the defendant's desires because of the defendant's difficulty in
replacing the appointed lawyer. Lawyers thus do not need to
develop a reputation for zealous, compassionate representation
in order to attract and to keep work.
Barristers are chosen and policed in very different ways
from lawyers. These differences may explain why the Lord
Chancellor appears to have ignored the dampening effect on in-
centives. The Government may be confident that these other
considerations will continue to encourage barristers to represent
indigents, and to perform appropriately. For one thing, barris-
ters who specialize in crime would face the difficulty of retooling
to compete with other barristers in another field of advocacy.
For another, the cab-rank rule, requiring an available barrister
to accept a brief to represent a defendant, will force barristers to
continue to represent indigent defendants who seek help.22
A third difference is the most important. Barristers do not
work if they perform badly. Unlike lawyers who are appointed
how financial incentives "inappropriate [ly]" led to delay in guilty pleas nor proposed a
solution. See REFORMING LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 5, at 60-61, 6.7. This is an issue
discussed below. See part II(B) infra. It is safe to say the Lord Chancellor has not pub-
lished anything discussing how incentives are affected by changes in the remuneration
scheme.
21. For an argument that they should have this power, see Peter W. Tague, An
Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
22. While barristers can refuse work if the compensation is inadequate, the Bar
accepts that legal aid payments are sufficient. They have been, at least when compared
to remuneration in U.S. jurisdictions. There appears to be no study exploring how
much more barristers make in representing defendants who can pay. But with 94% of
criminal defendants in Crown Court making no contribution to the cost of their repre-
sentation, see REEoRMING LEcA SERVICES, supra note 5, at 61, 6.8, and undoubtedly
others receiving legal aid as well, there are not many defendants with the money to hire
a solicitor and barrister. Barristers who defend depend on legal aid for their incomes.
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by the court, barristers are selected by the solicitor who is the
actual representative of the criminal defendant. Thus, even in
legal aid cases the defendant, through the solicitor, chooses the
barrister, unlike in the United States, where the indigent defend-
ant has a lawyer chosen for (or imposed upon) him. Barristers
are not briefed unless the solicitor expects them to perform ap-
propriately. The barrister who receives a brief risks being fired
for not performing as expected, because the indigent defendant
can replace the barrister relatively easily. Should he displease
the solicitor (or the defendant), the barrister risks even more
than the loss of the particular brief; he may lose the solicitor's
business in future cases.
Thus, there are structural reasons that could assuage the
worry that changes in the compensatory scheme will undermine
effective, efficient representation by barristers. Nonetheless, one
could expect that changes in compensation will lead a certain
number of barristers to find an excuse not to accept an indi-
gent's brief, or to shirk when representing an indigent. Identify-
ing various areas in which representation could change is the
topic of this Essay. That purpose is illustrated by comparing the
incentives under the ex-post facto and graduated fee schemes.
A secondary purpose of this Essay is to illustrate some of the
marked differences in practice between barristers and lawyers.
To presage one example, barristers were once rewarded for
shortening the proceedings, an inducement that could have cre-
ated a conflict between the barrister and defendant, with the for-
mer refusing to call or to cross-examine a witness, or to advance
a position that the defendant favored. Lawyers, by contrast,
often attack broadly, never relinquishing any point that holds
the possibility of undermining the prosecution's case.
I. TWO COMPENSATORY SCHEMES
How are barristers compensated under the graduated fee
scheme and how were they under the prior, ex-postfacto system?
Barristers are paid a basic fee for preparing the brief23 and for
23. The brief is the set of papers collected and prepared by the solicitor. It in-
cludes the charging documents, the Crown's disclosure of materials, statements from
the defendant and possibly his witnesses, and the defendant's instructions to the barris-
ter concerning the issues to raise and the facts to present, together with the defendant's
indication of a desire to fight or to plead guilty.
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the trial's first day (if the defendant has not pleaded guilty), and
a separate fee ("refresher") for each additional trial day. They
are also paid for particular conduct like conferring with the so-
licitor and defendant before or during the trial,24 visiting the
crime scene, and listening to a tape-recording of the defendant's
interview with the police.25
Basic fees under the graduated fee scheme are set in ad-
vance, as they were in the bulk of cases under the discarded
scheme. Creating the new scheme must have been difficult, but
administering it is simple. 26 All offenses are now assigned to one
of nine classes, and for the charged offense a basic fee is set in
light of the way the case was resolved (by plea or by trial, as ex-
plained below) .27 In most cases under the old scheme-those
where junior barristers represented the defendant-the basic fee
was also set in advance. In 1996, junior barristers received a ba-
sic fee of £221.50 if the case was tried, no matter how long they
toiled in preparing and a set refresher of £158.25.28 That fixed
fee did not itself create an incentive for the junior to perform
skillfully or to retain the brief. When tested only by the compen-
satory scheme, juniors were indifferent as to the brief they
took. 9
24. The time taken to prepare for a pretrial conference, however, is not compen-
sated separately, but considered part of the basic fee; similarly, short conferences dur-
ing the trial are part of the refresher, although conferences that last a longer (but
unspecified) time deserve special compensation.
25. The amounts for these specific acts are calculated by the hour, for Queen's
Counsel and forjuniors. The amounts are £62.50 for a Queen's Counsel and £33.50 for
ajunior. See 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, supra note 7, sched. C, 21.
26. The difficulty involved comparing offenses, assigning each to a class, and then
calculating the different amounts to pay as a basic fee for each class of offense. It was
not the Lord Chancellor's purpose to lower the payments barristers had received under
the old scheme, but to establish a way to control costs in the future. Thus, the gradu-
ated fee scheme, whose development was fashioned with close participation by the Bar,
should not drive barristers from representing legally-aided criminal defendants because
the compensation will worsen. Administration should be simple in that the fee can be
calculated easily.
27. The basic fee also varies depending upon the number of witnesses the Crown
calls and quantity of paper it discloses to the defense as part of discovery.
28. See 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, supra note 7, pt. I, sched. 2 (tbl.).
29. This indifference led to the return of many briefs. An appalling feature of
English practice, one that undermines the value of the cab-rank rule, is the number of
briefs that are returned, fully 50% in defense cases. See General Council of the Bar,
Study of Remuneration of Barristers Carrying Out Criminal Legal Aid, Annex B, tbl. B5,
at B7. On the other hand, other motivations, like pleasing the solicitor or the clerk of
the barrister's chambers (who distributes work among the juniors), or the challenge of
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The major difference between the two schemes lies in calcu-
lating barristers' fees in the more serious cases. Under the grad-
uated fee scheme the amount is, as noted, established in ad-
vance, with higher payments for different classes reflecting the
severity of the offense.3 0 Under the old scheme, by contrast,
cases were divided into standard and non-standard (more prop-
erly, "ex-post facto") cases. Junior barristers appeared in cases
warranting a standard award, and were paid a set fee as noted
above. With ex-post facto cases, however, after the matter had
ended, the basic fee and any refresher were decided by a mem-
ber of the Lord Chancellor's Department. Called a determining
officer, this person reviewed the defense's file, a claim form
completed by the barrister indicating the time taken to prepare
the brief and the monetary amount sought, and any memoran-
dum the barrister chose to submit explaining the difficulties en-
countered in representing the defendant.
3 1
Barristers were eligible for ex-postfacto fees in only three in-
stances: the crime charged was very serious;3 2 the trial, no mat-
ter what the offense, ran for more than three days (or would
have, if the defendant had not pleaded guilty); or a "standard
fee [was] inappropriate taking into account all the relevant cir-
cumstances of the case .... ,,33 Queen's Counsel automatically
intricate legal or factual issues, might have goaded juniors to prepare, to keep the brief,
and to advocate effectively. Moreover, juniors could receive higher, ex post facto com-
pensation if "owing to the exceptional circumstances of the case" the standard fees
"would not provide reasonable remuneration . . . ." The Legal Aid in Criminal Care
and Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 1989, Legal Aid, S.I. 1989, No. 343, reg. 9(5) (b)
(U.K.). If ajunior thought he could persuade a Taxing Officer to make such a determi-
nation after the case ended, then he would have an incentive to keep the brief. Taxing
officers are quasi-judicial officers who consider appeals from awards made by determin-
ing officers. Such appeals were often granted, I was told by a Taxing Master, although
there is apparently no record of the numbers to confirm the point.
30. Under the graduated fee scheme, fees for trials lasting longer than 10 days are
also calculated ex post facto. Because such a process can be arbitrary and also lead to the
award of higher fees, the Lord Chancellor intends to extend the scheme to trials lasting
as long as 25 days, and to negotiate individual contracts for trials expected to last even
longer.
31. This information, together with much else (the official papers, the solicitor's
brief, the witnesses' statements, for example), I reviewed in the cases referred to in this
Essay. See Tague, supra note 1, at 173-74 (describing material in files).
32. The crime had to be categorized as a class 1 or class 2 offense (like murder or
manslaughter). See ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE (Tables &
Index) 709, G-7 (P.J. Richardson ed. 1996).
33. The Legal Aid in Criminal Care and Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 1989,
Legal Aid, S.I. 1989, No. 343, reg. 9(2) (U.K.).
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qualified to receive ex-postfacto fees because they cannot appear
for a legally-aided defendant unless the offense is murder or the
case is so "exceptional [ly] difficult[ ], grave[ ] or complex[ ] ...
that the interests of justice ... require the services of two coun-
sel."34
The determining officer's responsibility demanded a hercu-
lean calculation of various considerations.35 She was expected to
decide if the advocate should have performed the work he said
he undertook, and then whether he had acted efficiently. Hav-
ing answered those questions, she was to choose an amount for
the basic fee and refreshers that matched the "weight, serious-
ness, importance and complexity of the case ....
In the cases in my study, determining officers commonly
found that barristers acted inefficiently, as federal judges occa-
sionally do with lawyers,37 and accordingly paid only a portion of
the amounts sought by the advocates.38 Unlike lawyers, however,
barristers were also rewarded for reducing the time needed to
adjudicate the controversy and for acting efficiently in preparing
to advocate.
As remains so under the graduated fee scheme, the basic
fee in ex-postfacto cases was a function of the stage at which the
matter was resolved. The barrister's basic fee was the lowest
34. The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (General) Regulations 1989,
Legal Aid, S.I. 1989, No. 344, reg. 48(2) (b) (U.K.). Queen's Counsel can now appear
by themselves, without the assistance of a junior, but experience indicates that few do.
Indeed, the cases in my study suggest that this test is not interpreted narrowly, so that
defendants often received the help of a Queen's Counsel (and ajunior and solicitor, of
course) in not very difficult defenses. For an example, see the text infra accompanying
note 50. The Lord Chancellor seems determined to restrict further when Queen's
Counsel can appear. See Clampdown on Legal Aid, supra note 17.
35. The Lord Chancellor's suspicion that determining officers' awards were not
always justifiable was an important ingredient in the decision to scuttle the old scheme.
Another factor was the difficulty in controlling the ever-increasing budget in ex-postfocto
cases, and the hope that with set fees for each category of offense future costs will be
more predictable. It is not the case, though, that ex-postfacto fees have been eliminated
under the graduated fee scheme, but that process is reserved for very long and unusual
cases.
36. LoRD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, TAXING OFICERs-NOTS FOR GUIDANCE 8,
20 (1979).
37. See United States v. Carnevale, 624 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1985) (stating that
defense lawyer paid less than hourly rate established by statute because of uninspired
performance).
38. See Tague, supra note 6. The largest reduction was suffered by a Queen's
Counsel who received less than half (3000) of the amount (E6250) he sought, based
on 22 hours of preparation.
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when the defendant announced the intent to plead guilty before
the day of trial. Except for mitigating a defendant's sentencing,
this indication frees the defending barrister to shift his attention
to other briefs. The basic fee climbed much higher when the
case was tried, but reached its acme when the trial "cracked."3 9
That phenomenon occurred when the defendant, having sig-
naled a desire to fight, instead caved and elected to plead guilty
on the day of trial.4 ° The reason why a cracked trial commands
the highest effective hourly rate is unclear. One explanation,
offered by a person experienced in taxation, is that the higher
fee recognizes that the barrister prepared for trial but ultimately
convinced the defendant to plead guilty. But this is not persua-
sive because the preparation undertaken should be the same
since the barrister does not know whether the defendant will ul-
timately plead guilty or fight at trial. Moreover, the barrister
whose client fights effectively is penalized because the basic fee
includes the trial's first five-hour day and any short conferences
on that day. One would thus expect the barrister who goes to
trial to deserve the highest basic fee, both in gross and as calcu-
lated by time spent in preparation and performance. On the
other hand, because the defendant's decision to plead guilty
supposedly surprised the barrister, he would have no other brief
as a substitute,41 and perhaps should therefore be compensated
as if the case had been tried.42
Barristers were also rewarded for shortening a trial by, for
39. The basic fee might have been higher in gross when the case was tried, but
lower when calculated in terms of the hours the barrister took to prepare (what might
be called the "effective hourly rate") because the basic fee for a case tried includes the
five hours of the trial's first day. While barristers have resisted payment by time ex-
pended, because such a system could reward the slothful and penalize the swift, it is the
only currency that can be used to compare compensation received in different cases.
40. The federal compensatory scheme, of course, contains none of these distinc-
tions. The lawyer totals his hours, and they are multiplied by the relevant hourly rate.
41. Of course, the barrister's clerk might find another brief for him, although such
an occurrence would be extremely rare for a Queen's Counsel. This point illustrates
another difference between lawyers' and barristers' work. Barristers typically work on
few cases simultaneously, often one at a time. There is little incentive to prepare a brief
that has no fixed date for trial because briefs are returned so frequently. Only very
serious cases, typically involving a leader, received fixed dates. Moreover, barristers can-
not schedule the appearance of a number of defendants to plead guilty, as lawyers do,
to minimize the advocate's time in court.
42. One might describe the result as including within the basic fee for a cracked
trial part of the refreshers the barrister would have received if the case had instead been
tried.
HeinOnline -- 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1138 1999-2000
2000] REPRESENTING PUBIJCLY-FUNDED CRIM1NAL DEEDANTS 1139
example, stipulating to the admission of evidence or electing not
to call witnesses or introduce evidence.43 They received a higher
effective hourly rate if they needed less time to prepare than a
hypothetical benchmark established by determining officers in
certain sorts of cases."
Whether by design or not, the graduated fee scheme elimi-
nates several of the old scheme's incentives to perform effi-
ciently. For the Lord Chancellor, the most important reason to
adopt the new scheme was to corral future costs. The Bar's aims,
in its negotiation with the Lord Chancellor, were to avoid a re-
duction in the current levels of compensation, to escape the va-
garies of the decisions by determining officers and to accelerate
the receipt of payment. Both protagonists appeared to ignore
whether the payment scheme might advance or retard effective
advocacy. With this introduction, the discussion turns to specific
incentives for the advocate to act efficiently and effectively that
existed in the old scheme, and to learn their fate under the grad-
uated fee approach.
II. INCENTIVES TO REDUCE THE COST OF RESOLVING
THE CASE
The resources needed to adjudicate a prosecution could be
43. A lawyer's economic incentive, by contrast, is to extend or shorten the trial
depending on the number of hours needed to reach the compensatory ceiling.
44. A determining officer told me that barristers were expected to need around 20
hours to prepare to defend a murder charge. A barrister who took less time to prepare
would receive a higher effective hourly rate; one who took more time would receive a
lower effective rate, unless he justified the deviation. Determining officers never publi-
cized this benchmark, and its use could lead to peculiar results. It did not assume, for
example, that barristers were effectively fungible, so that other barristers would also
have needed, say, no more than 10 hours or as many as 30 hours taken by the barrister
seeking compensation. Also, using a benchmark ignores the contributions of the in-
structing solicitor and junior. The time needed by a leader ought to be a function of
the thoroughness of the brief and of the junior's preparation of it. It seems peculiar
that a leader would benefit financially if the solicitor's brief was so thorough that he
needed less time to prepare than usual, or suffer if his junior's efforts proved so ineffec-
tual that he had to assume work that ajunior would otherwise be expected to perform.
For an example, see Tague, supra note 6, at 436-38. An experienced commentator de-
cried using a "suggested bench mark" as "highly dangerous and although it may be that
Determining Officers do work by rule of thumb the fact is that the Determining Officer
should consider what work needed to be done and what was a reasonable time for
doing it." Yet, without a benchmark, a determining officer has no compass to gauge
any fee, or to ensure that her awards are more or less uniform with those of her col-
leagues.
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influenced by the work of the junior barrister, and reduced by
eliminating or shortening the trial.
A. The Work of Junior Barristers
The cost of the defense soars when a leader joins a junior in
representing the defendant.45 The junior commonly receives
half the Queen's Counsel's typically handsome payment. One
obvious way of reducing costs, then, is to ensure that juniors do
not inappropriately ask to be led. If, however, the junior lacks
the needed skill or believes that the defendant, because of his
peril, deserves to be represented by a leader, then the junior
should advise the solicitor to seek a leader. But the junior also
has an incentive to exaggerate the difficulties posed by the rep-
resentation.46 Once led, he can expect a large payment without
regard to his contribution to the defense.47 Indeed, he has an
incentive to shirk by transferring to the leader the burden of
preparation.48 When the leader worked more, and the junior
less, than expected, the leader might receive a high gross pay-
ment, an amount that translated into a low effective hourly rate
for the leader but a high rate for the junior.49 In turn, the solici-
tor has no incentive to reject the junior's suggestion to request a
45. This explains why the Lord Chancellor is interested in limiting the instances
when Queen's Counsel, the highest paid advocate, can appear. See TAGUE, supra note
16.
46. Of course, ajudge might recognize the exaggeration and embarrass the junior
by refusing the application. But if an application is made, the judge might grant it to
spare the junior a different source of embarrassment, to appear alone when he is inex-
perienced. There seems to be no record of the applications to learn how many are
refused and why.
47. In defending the time they took to prepare in their submissions in the cases in
the study, no Queen's Counsel complained about the junior's efforts to the determin-
ing officer. Even so, several leaders labored longer than did the junior in preparing,
thereby violating the Lord Chancellor's model of discouraging those with more experi-
ence (and presumably greater skill) from undertaking work that less experienced (and
thus less expensive) legal actors could adequately perform. See LoaD CHANCELLOR'S
DEPARTMENT, supra note 36, at 35, 1 107. Not surprisingly, these leaders received
among the lowest effective hourly rates. The lesson was that they should have de-
manded more work from their juniors.
48. Here too, practice may douse this incentive. A conscientious junior would con-
tinue to work, to help the defendant, and to smooth the leader's assumption of control.
And leaders may demand much from the junior (and solicitor), in effect capitalizing on
their efforts.
49. Consider two cases in the study in which the junior took 12 hours to prepare
and his leader much longer. For 21 hours of preparation, one Queen's Counsel re-
ceived a basic fee of £3000 (or £115 as an effective hourly rate); his junior, £1500 (or
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leader. The solicitor can please the defendant and enhance his
reputation by persuading him that through the solicitor's (and
the junior's) efforts, the defense has been strengthened by the
addition of the leader.
The ex-postfacto scheme included two incentives to dissuade
juniors from asking to be led or from shirking if led. By repre-
senting the defendant by themselves they could be paid more
than if led. And, if led, they could be paid more than half the
leader's remuneration by making a special contribution to the
defense. There was no evidence in the cases studied that this
first incentive caused any juniors to forego asking to be led. In-
deed, there were several instances when the junior's justification
for being led was unconvincing. In a prosecution for raping two
teenage girls, for example, the junior's request for a leader was
surprising in that the only difficulty he posited was the need to
compare the victims' testimony at an old-style committal hearing
with each victim's statement to the police,5" a total of thirty-four
pages. By seeking help, this presumably experienced junior in-
dicted not only his own prowess,5 1 but also that of the solicitor
for choosing a diffident or slothful junior advocate. 2
The ineffectiveness of this first incentive could be explained
by a junior's difficulty in predicting the fee if he were led or
acted alone. Juniors probably expected to receive a higher
amount by tying their remuneration to a leader's than by repre-
senting the defendant by themselves. Two other reasons coun-
tered their interest in acting alone. When led, their responsibil-
ity drops and they gain the opportunity of learning from a
leader.53
£88 per hour). The basic fee for the Queen's Counsel in the other case, for 37 hours of
preparation, was £3750 (£91 per hour). His junior received £1875 (£110).
50. An old-style committal hearing was the equivalent of a contested preliminary
examination in the United States. It has now been abolished.
51. Called to the Bar in 1975, this junior would have been practicing for 17 years.
52. Although the force of this criticism is blunted by the fact that the request was
approved, it is perhaps understandable why judges might not reject such requests. Re-
jection would embarrass both the junior and the solicitor for failing in their responsibil-
ities. No one has apparently studied how often and why judges approve requests for a
leader in non-homicide prosecutions. One observer thought that judges frequently re-
jected requests for a leader, but was not asked to comment on the instances I found
where the grant of the request was surprising.
53. Offsetting these reasons to be led is the junior's interest in gaining experience
in serious cases, in hope of garnering more important briefs and, eventually, of being
promoted to Queen's Counsel.
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There was some evidence of the second incentive-induc-
ing the junior to make a stellar effort-at work. In two cases,
juniors received more than half the Queen's Counsel's basic fee.
One was rewarded when forced to represent the defendant by
himself until near the trial because of the difficulty in retaining a
leader. The other was because his leader was reluctant both to
speak with the defendant or to prepare, thus forcing the junior
to assume more responsibility than normal.
A third case illustrated another value of this second incen-
tive. A defendant, charged with murder and thus entitled to two
barristers, instead was satisfied to be represented by a single jun-
ior because he was impressed by the junior's efforts during the
defendant's old-style committal hearing. Near the trial this jun-
ior asked to be led, without explaining the reason. It appears he
received more than half the leader's payment. Had he not, the
prospect of receiving no more than half the leader's fee might
cause such a junior to hesitate to ask for a leader near the trial.
He would know that his extensive efforts would reduce the time
needed by the leader to prepare, thus probably causing the
leader to receive a relatively low gross fee. Half of that low fee
might be less, even considerably less, than what the junior would
receive by continuing to act alone. Yet, if a leader were
needed-the junior suddenly felt overwhelmed by the quantity
of evidence, for example, or unsure whether he could counter a
new expert the Crown indicated it would use-the junior might
be reluctant to call for help without this second incentive, and
the defendant could suffer.
The graduated fee scheme virtually eliminated the first of
these two incentives, and did delete the second. The first cur-
renfly applies only in multi-defendant prosecutions, and then
only when the co-defendant is represented by a leader and jun-
ior and the junior's defendant is charged with an offense that
falls within the same class as one of the offenses charged against
the co-defendant.54 In this narrow instance the junior has no
monetary incentive to ask to be led because he will be paid as if
he were being led. With the financial factor eliminated, such a
junior balances the extra work involved and the fear of failure in
acting alone, when deciding whether to request a leader, against
the defendant's needs and the opportunity to learn if led.
54. See 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, supra note 7, sched. 3, 23(2).
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Whenever the prosecution involves a single defendant, how-
ever, juniors might clamor to be led whenever the crime falls
into any category other than the most serious. Only with "homi-
cide and related grave offenses," as Class A crimes are described,
does the junior receive half the Queen's Counsel's fees. With
every other offense, the junior's compensation, when represent-
ing the defendant by himself, is significantly less than half that
received by a Queen's Counsel. 5 Yet, while thus encouraged to
ask to be led, juniors receive no more, but also never less, than
half the Queen's Counsel's award. Thus, the junior is neither
rewarded for a stellar performance, nor punished for shirking.
Hence, when viewed only from the perspective of compensation,
juniors have an incentive to increase the cost of the defense by
asking to be led and, once led, have an incentive to shirk.
There are ways to counter the failure to include these incen-
tives in the graduated fee scheme. A junior's request for a
leader could be scrutinized much more skeptically by the judici-
ary,5 '6 and denied when the junior appears sufficiently skilled or
the solicitor has time to retain a more confidentjunior.57 Lead-
ers have reason to police the junior to prevent shirking. Because
the leader's basic fee under the new scheme has lost its relation-
ship to the hours taken to prepare, he maximizes his effective
hourly return by doing less himself, achieved by driving the jun-
ior to undertake more preparation than usual. Moreover, the
junior could be punished if the leader complained to the solici-
tor about the junior's effort, or the solicitor himself concluded
that the junior was not behaving as expected. Either event could
55. For example, with a Class D offense (serious sexual offenses), a Queen's Coun-
sel's basic fee is £1550.50, that of all other advocates,' £446.50 (29% of the Queen's
Counsel's, and only 57% of that received if led). For each refresher, the Queen's Coun-
sel receives £413.50, all others £145.50 (32% of the Queen's Counsel's, and 63% of that
received if led). The uplift for each trial day, however, is almost 50% (£574.50 vs.
£282), and the uplift for each page of the Crown's evidence is almost 40% (£2.75 vs.
£1.08), as is the uplift for each Crown witness (£18.13 vs. £7.14).
56. No study has been done of the judicial process of appointing leaders (a
Queen's Counsel or experienced junior), but anecdotal evidence suggests that the judi-
ciary routinely appoints Queen's Counsel in cases that a lawyer with a modicum of
experience would be expected to undertake in a public defender's office in the United
States.
57. A variation of this approach may be adopted by the Lord Chancellor. The
instances when Queen's Counsel can appear will simply be reduced. See TAGUE, supra
note 16. This attempt, however, may fail if any discretion remains to appoint a leader in
a case that seems modestly difficult, as the junior seeks help.
HeinOnline -- 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1143 1999-2000
1144 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:1128
cause the junior's ouster from the particular case or cost the jun-
ior a source of briefs in the future.
B. Shortening the Prosecution
Two other ways to reduce expenditures are to resolve prose-
cutions by a guilty plea or to shorten trials. In ex-postfacto cases,
defending barristers were paid a higher basic fee, when calcu-
lated as an effective hourly rate, when the trial was abbreviated
through their effort, and the highest fee when the case cracked.
The new scheme scraps the first incentive but continues the sec-
ond.
Barristers clearly were aware of these incentives, as my study
revealed, mentioning the relevant reason in the memorandum
submitted to persuade the determining officer to award the
amount sought. The highest effective hourly rate (£535, equal
to US$803) was received by a Queen's Counsel whose defend-
ant's guilty plea, entered as the trial was to begin, eliminated the
need for a five-day trial. The next highest effective hourly rate
(£300) was received by a different Queen's Counsel when, ac-
cording to the judge's comment, the case, anticipated to last
over a week, was ended by guilty plea through the barrister's ef-
forts, again on the trial's first day. On the other hand, of those
cases resolved by trial, it is less clear that the two Queen's Coun-
sel were rewarded who, in separate cases, each claimed his ad-
missions or agreements with the Crown had shortened the pro-
ceeding (by three days in one case and by four in the other).
One received an effective hourly rate of £149 and the other,
£129.8
Yet, rewarding the barrister in each instance could be prob-
lematic in two ways: there lurks the potential for a conflict be-
tween the advocate's and the defendant's interests; the cracked
58. The former's rate was the second highest of all awards in cases resolved by trial.
The highest was £200. But of those Queen's Counsel who did not profess to shorten
the trial, two received a rate of £140 and two others in the low £120s. The others re-
ceived much less, with the lowest a paltry £91.50. While the effective hourly rates of
these two who shortened the trial are princely when compared with the hourly rates
received by lawyers, one might have expected a higher figure in light of the policy of
encouraging a speedy resolution of cases. Perhaps determining officers were reluctant
to reward these leaders because of the difficulty in establishing the causal link between
the trial's length and the barrister's efforts. Or perhaps they thought the banisters
were responding only to pressure from the trial judge to forego challenging non-con-
troversial evidence or demanding specific proof of some point from the Crown.
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trial creates its own expenses. One case in the study suggested
the first problem-the lamentable possibility that the barrister
might bully a defendant who wanted a trial to plead guilty5 9
The defendant was charged in connection with the importation
of a large cache of drugs. As part of the plea agreement, he
would inform on others. His Queen's Counsel justified his re-
quest for a sizeable basic fee by noting his difficulty in convinc-
ing the suspicious defendant to plead guilty and the value to so-
ciety of such an outcome. But for his persuasive skill, the de-
fendant, the Queen's Counsel contended, would not have
pleaded guilty and two costs-that of a long trial and of the
harm caused by his compatriots-would have been incurred.
Although this Queen's Counsel's justification suggests the alarm-
ing possibility of treachery within the defense camp, with the
barrister becoming an ally of the prosecution, it is more likely
that the Queen's Counsel was exaggerating his role to persuade
the determining officer to award the fee he sought. Nonethe-
less, the case presents a sober reminder that rewarding barristers
for shortening the proceedings could induce a barrister to stray
from his adversarial role.
The advocate was paid more generously by convincing the
defendant to plead guilty on the trial's threshold in ex-postfacto
cases so he could be rewarded for shortening the trial. In effect,
he could capture part of the fee he would have received (refresh-
ers) had the trial lasted as long as expected. This incentive also
introduced the threat of treachery. While by waiving an eviden-
tiary objection, for example, or by not introducing evidence the
advocate could be trusted to be seeking a tactical advantage, this
incentive made any unexplained concession suspicious. Did the
barrister instead seek to profit by pocketing both a higher basic
fee for abbreviating the trial and a second basic fee for the brief
he otherwise would have had to return if the case had lasted as
long as expected? Despite this risk, there was no evidence of
such conduct in the cases in this study where barristers sought
59. In the United States, lawyers are sometimes prepared to manipulate the de-
fendant in almost any way to convince him to plead guilty. This is wrong if the lawyer's
purpose is to maximize his return from a fee-paying client, but understandable, even
justifiable, if the purpose is to avoid the much more punitive sanction that accompanies
a conviction by trial than by guilty plea in manyjurisdictions. In the latter instance, the
lawyer aims to protect the defendant from a harsh sentence, not to advance his own
interest.
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an enhanced basic fee for conceding a point or not introducing
evidence.6'
In addition to tempting a barrister to pressurize a guilty plea
from a defendant who wanted to fight and stood a possibility of
an acquittal, the enhanced payment for a cracked trial creates a
greater possibility of this as it saves costs. Paying a higher basic
fee for a cracked trial encourages barristers to delay negotiations
both with the defendant over his intent to plead or fight, and
with the prosecuting barrister over his willingness to accept a
plea to less than the counts charged. Thus, while a guilty plea
on the day of trial saves the cost of a trial, each side could have
eliminated part of the time taken to prepare if only they had
negotiated the matter at an earlier point.61 Moreover, a cracked
trial may idle a judge until another case is assigned to him for
resolution, and, when that happens, that defendant may suffer
the loss of his barrister who is occupied elsewhere and must re-
turn the brief. Thus, the costs of a cracked trial ripple through
the process, offsetting the savings from eliminating the need to
pay refreshers to the defending barrister.
In ex-postfacto cases, the defending barrister's economic in-
terests did not incline him to encourage the defendant to decide
to plead guilty much before the trial date. This is so because he
earned the lowest basic fee in this setting.62 Yet, if we ignore
whether it is in the defendant's interest to plead guilty, convinc-
60. These barristers, however, never explained the advantage of the concession, a
point that was unnecessary since determining officers were not permitted to evaluate
the wisdom of the advocate's tactical choices. While one must assume that the barris-
ters expected to benefit tactically from shortening the trial, lawyers would probably
refuse to concede anything to the prosecution, in hope that it would falter in its proof.
61. Here, too, practical points may better explain negotiations at the last moment.
For example, the following could occur: one or both barristers may have been briefed
only shortly before the trial's date, a barrister might be unwilling to negotiate until
more work is completed by the solicitor, the defending barrister is unable to confer.
with the defendant until the day of trial, or the defendant sheds his unrealistic expecta-
tions only when confronted by the trial.
62. This statement must be hedged with an important condition. The gross pay-
ment was the highest when the defendant pleaded guilty on the trial date, and lowest
when he agreed to do so at an earlier point. But the effective hourly rate would be a
function of the time expended by the barrister in preparing. Because the files in the
study involved only cracked trials and trials, there is no way of comparing the effective
hourly rates in all three settings. If the barrister took very little time to conclude that
the defendant would and should plead guilty, then his effective hourly rate would be
quite high because he would not need to prepare for trial, as the barrister would for a
trial that eventually cracked.
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ing the defendant to plead guilty as soon after the barrister re-
ceives the brief is the most economical outcome. Tinkering with
the defending barrister's compensation, however, is not the
most effective way to limit the number of cracked trials.63
It is not clear whether the Lord Chancellor recognized the
potential problems created by enhancing the advocate's pay-
ment when the trial cracked or was shortened. The latter incen-
tive is not included in the graduated fee scheme. The former is
included, although the wide gap that existed in the ex-post facto
cases in the study between the size of the basic fee for a cracked
trial and for a trial has been shrunk markedly. The difference is
now a modest four percent.64 Ironically, barristers might re-
spond by trying cases, all other things being equal,65 rather than
by encouraging the defendant to change his mind and plead
63. Two better ways involve reducing the sentencing discount as the trial ap-
proaches and conducting periodic pretrial hearings to learn the defendant's intent to
plead or fight. The same discount of about 30% applies no matter when the defendant
announces he will plead guilty. Even if a graduated discount were adopted, however, a
defendant could expect a discount of some sort were he to wait until the day of trial. If
he got none, then he has no incentive to plead guilty on the day set for trial. A form of
pretrial hearing (the Plea and Directions Hearing) now occurs in every case committed
to Crown Court for trial. Its purpose in part is to learn whether the defendant will
plead guilty. Resolving the case by plea at that stage requires that the defendant's rep-
resentatives have prepared sufficiently to advise the defendant properly of his choices.
As of 1997, the hearing had reduced the rate of cracked trials from 23% to 18%.
64. With Class B offenses (involving "serious violence or damage, and serious
drugs offenses"), for example, a Queen's Counsel's basic fee is £1143.50 for a cracked
trial and £1091 for a trial. All other advocates receive a basic fee of £326.50 or £311.50.
65. Of course, an advocate's decision to recommend a plea or a trial ought not to
be made in view of his expectation of payment, but rather on the evidence, the pre-
dicted outcome, and the defendant's desires. Nonetheless, in those cases where the
advocate does not have a strong view about that mix of proper factors, he could be
swayed to recommend a fight because of the minimal difference in gross between the
basic fees for a fight and a cracked trial, and of the certainty of receiving refreshers.
Moreover, the barrister might enjoy litigating a case he had thoroughly prepared, to
learn whether the story and outcome were as he expected. That said, the effective
hourly rate for a cracked trial will be rather higher because, even assuming the same
preparation time for a cracked trial and a trial, the basic fee for a trial includes the five
hours of the first day. So, for example, assuming the same time to prepare (15 hours),
a Queen's Counsel defending a Class A offense would receive an effective hourly rate of
£113 if the trial cracked (£1619/15) and £81 for a trial (£1619/20). And further com-
plicating any prediction of the incentives are two other points. The advocate receives a
handsome uplift for each day in trial (with Class B offenses, £636.50 for a Queen's
Counsel and £182 for other advocates). Yet, the advocate also receives a much higher
payment for each page of the Crown's evidence when the trial cracks than when it
proceeds (in a Class B offense, for pages 11-250, a Queen's Counsel would receive
£2150 in a cracked trial and £1183 in a trial).
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guilty on the day of trial.6 6 This is especially so for a barrister
who has no brief for several days and who would prefer the cer-
tainty of receiving refreshers in a case he has prepared to the
uncertainty of receiving a returned brief in a case whose issues
might not interest him.
III. ENSURING ADQUATE ADVOCACY
Efficiency is an unworthy goal if its pursuit causes deficient
representation. One wants to avoid incentives that deter barris-
ters from preparing thoroughly and advocating effectively. Yet,
as with the goal of promoting efficiency, there are ways apart
from the compensatory scheme that more directly contribute to
the barrister's performance. The most obvious is the barrister's
dependence upon solicitors for briefs. The solicitor, acting for
the defendant, can replace the barrister for any reason. A barris-
ter who imperiously ignores the defendant's desires or inexcus-
ably botches the advocacy can be fired by the defendant. More-
over, even if not replaced, the barrister, by displeasing the de-
fendant or solicitor, jeopardizes his future relationship with that
solicitor and his reputation with other solicitors. Also, a dis-
tressed defendant can appeal against conviction based on the
barrister's faulty performance. While the likelihood of success
on appeal is slight, given the imposing burden the defendant
must meet,67 even an unsuccessful appeal could mar the barris-
ter's reputation. Last, the high fees garnered by Queen's Coun-
sel encourage juniors to strive to provide exemplary representa-
tion, in order to impress the judges and others whose opinions
count in deciding which juniors will be elevated to the rank of
Queen's Counsel.
The ex-post facto scheme contained two incentives affecting
the barrister's preparation-a determining officer's decision
66. As remains true under the graduated fee scheme, advocates receive the lowest
basic fee for a guilty plea. For Class B offenses, for example, juniors and solicitor-advo-
cates receive a basic fee of £326.50 for a cracked trial, £311.50 for a trial, and £204.50
for a guilty plea. Calculated as an effective hourly rate, however, these payments might
look different. Assume the junior's preparation was two hours for a guilty plea (£102),
five for a cracked trial (£65), and 10 (five for preparation, five for the trial's first day)
for a trial (31). The incentive to pressurize the defendant to plead guilty very early
evaporates by assuming the junior took an additional hour to prepare (£204/3 £68).
67. See R. v. Clinton, 2 All E.R. 998, 1005 (C.A. Crim. Div. 1993) (stating that de-
fendant must show "all the promptings of reason and good sense point[ ] the other way
[that is, to another option]").
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whether the barrister had performed efficiently, and payment
for preparing a returned brief-but none relating to his per-
formance. The absence of incentives linked to performance has
an obvious explanation. While the files analyzed the barristers'
and solicitors' submissions and contained considerable informa-
tion about their work, determining officers would also have
needed to learn about the tactical decisions made by the profes-
sionals. Even if barristers would have agreed to provide that in-
formation, determining officers, with no legal training were not
sufficiently skilled to evaluate performance.
Barristers ought to be encouraged to prepare as they think
necessary. Yet, grading the length of the barrister's preparation,
and finding that he ought to have prepared more expeditiously,
as occurred under the ex-postfacto scheme, might have depressed
the barrister's interest in preparing thoroughly. Barristers may
not have learned of this disincentive, however, because deter-
mining officers did not publish their benchmarks or regularly
explain why they had slashed the fees requested. Thus, barris-
ters were probably perplexed by the outcome without learning
that either greater expedition or less work was the lesson to
learn. Or barristers might have prepared as they thought neces-
sary, resigned to the prospect of not being compensated as they
thought appropriate.
The graduated fee scheme almost eliminates the link be-
tween the time taken to prepare and the barrister's compensa-
tion. No longer will a barrister's efficiency be graded in setting
the remuneration. Instead, with the basic fee established for
each category of offense, barristers internalize the cost of their
time: the less they prepare, the higher their effective hourly rate
will be. Ironically, then, the new scheme may encourage barris-
ters either to prepare less than they might have under the old
scheme or to delegate work to the solicitor or to the junior that
they should undertake themselves.
The new scheme, however, does seem to recognize that
straitjacketing the fee by categories of offenses might discourage
a barrister from preparing an especially difficult defense. Thus,
because the case "involves a very unusual or novel point of law or
factual issue," the defense demands "preparation substantially in
excess of the amount normally done for cases of the same
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type,"' and the basic fee can be increased. Yet, the increase is
minuscule,69 and applicable only to "a very few genuinely excep-
tional cases" where more preparation than that implicitly as-
sumed in the basic fees is clearly needed."y
The second feature affecting preparation under the ex-post
facto scheme-paying for preparation even when the brief was
returned-should have encouraged preparation. The scourge
of the legally-aided defense, especially where the compensation
is lower (as it was and remains for less experienced junior barris-
ters), is the frequency in which barristers return the brief, to rep-
resent someone else, and leave the bereft defendant with a bar-
rister who may open the brief only hours before the trial is to
begin." The returned brief cancels the advantage of the cab-
rank rule, relegating the defendant to a barrister who, even if
skilled, has scant time to prepare and may take a different view
of the appropriate tactics, even of the wisdom of contesting the
charges, than did the replaced barrister. Even juniors who are
briefed often delay preparing until they are rather sure that they
will not need to return the brief.
The defense would no doubt improve if the barrister be-
came involved soon after receiving the brief. He would have
time to orchestrate the investigation, react to newly-obtained in-
formation, plot the defense, and confer with the instructing so-
licitor and defendant. He might become sufficiently interested
in the case to struggle to avoid returning the brief. The barris-
ter's involvement would be especially salutary in ex-postfacto cases
where, by contrast to standard-fee cases,72 the risks were higher
68. 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, supra note 7, sched. 3, 17(2).
69. The extra compensation seems to be limited to an hourly rate (£62.50 for
Queen's Counsel, £33.50 for a junior) for each extra hour above the norm. The advo-
cate carries the burden of proving that the legal or factual issue was unusual or novel.
70. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, GUIDANCE TO DETERMINING OFFICERS ON THE
GRADUATED FEE SCHEME FOR ADVOCATES IN THE CROWN COURT AND EXAMPLE FEE CALCU-
LATIONS 18 (1997).
71. See supra note 30.
72. In standard-fee cases juniors typically did not receive (nor seek) payment for
preparing a brief they returned; it was assumed that they took or returned briefs to
maximize the time they were in court. As a result, many standard-fee briefs might have
been insufficiently prepared, as the junior delayed planning the defense until he was
sure he would not be engaged elsewhere or that no more tempting brief was available.
Offsetting any lack of preparation, however, was the fact that with experience juniors
could defend most of these cases without much rumination.
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for the defendant, the trial would typically last longer, and the
case usually demanded more attention.
This incentive worked to a degree in the cases in this study.
Every barrister who returned the brief had undertaken prepara-
tion, and was paid for the effort. Yet, whether the defense was
improved remains unclear because the barrister was not also re-
quired to instruct the replacement about his views. However,
while there was no evidence in this study that any replacement
benefited from the departing barrister's efforts, it is possible that
help came from the solicitor's report of conversations he had
had with the first barrister or from an advice on evidence pre-
pared by the first barrister.73
The graduated fee scheme virtually eliminates this impor-
tant incentive to prepare a brief the barrister worries he might
need to return. A preparation fee is now paid when the brief is
returned only if three imposing conditions are met. The barris-
ter must expend more than eight hours in preparing and then
convince a determining officer that the preparation was "reason-
ably carried out."7 4 Last, the trial must last longer than five days
or, when the defendant instead pleads guilty, the prosecution's
evidence consists of more than 150 pages.75 These conditions
will discourage barristers from preparing until rather certain
they will not return the brief, thereby creating the risk that some
aspect of the defense will be overlooked or not developed.
On the other hand, despite the unlikelihood of receiving
compensation for a returned brief,7 6 barristers may not dally in
73. An advice on evidence consists of the barrister's answers to the solicitor's ques-
tions about directions.
74. 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, supra note 7, sched. 3, 18(2).
75. Based on my study, the Lord Chancellor might also add a requirement that the
replaced barrister must share his work with the replacement. In so doing the represen-
tation might improve, if, for example, the first barrister spotted something that had
escaped the replacement. This condition carries the cost, however, of requiring an
evaluation of the replaced barrister's alleged contribution.
76. The Bar seems to be trying to arrange the apportionment of the basic fee be-
tween the barrister who returns the brief and his replacement. In July 1998, the Bar
announced that under the graduated fee scheme, barristers in the same chambers
should themselves decide upon the fee's division. If the barristers are in different
chambers, then they should make an agreement before the brief is returned. The Bar
acknowledges that it is not the determining officer's role to resolve a dispute over ap-
portionment between the barristers. "Their duty is to pay the correct fee to Counsel
who attended Court. It is no part of their concern that other Counsel may have worked
on the case when a graduated fee is payable." See General Counsel of the Bar of Eng-
land and Wales, BAR NEws, July 1998, at 10 (interpreting paragraph 309 of Bar's Code
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preparing at least those briefs where the category of offense
guarantees a high basic fee. A barrister will arrange his schedule
to avoid the need to return a brief that attracts a high basic fee.
This is especially true for juniors who are being led. And if inter-
ested in retaining the brief, the barrister has a reason to prepare,
to please the solicitor, and thus to attract future business from
him. For these reasons the loss of a specific payment for prepa-
ration may not compromise advocacy, at least in those cases
where the level of compensation parallels that in ex-post facto
cases.
77
CONCLUSION
One would expect the graduated fee scheme to achieve the
Lord Chancellor's three goals for creating it: to help to control
costs, to accelerate the determination of the appropriate fees to
pay advocates, and to reduce the unpredictability of the awards
in ex-postfacto cases. Seemingly ignored, however, was the effect
of this scheme on incentives to work efficiently and to prepare
thoroughly. Fees are now calculated without regard to the time
taken to prepare, or to tactical choices that shortened the trial.
Determining officers no longer punish dalliance or reward effi-
of Conduct). This directive is interesting in several ways. First, in ex-post facto cases,
determining officers were obligated to decide Whether and how much to pay each bar-
rister, the one (s) who returned the brief and the one who tried the case. In the cases in
the study, every barrister who represented the defendant was paid a basic fee. Hence,
the total cost of barristers' fees was probably higher in ex-post facto cases because the
barristers did not split one basic fee, but each received one. Hence, there was no disin-
centive to prepare. Second, it may prove difficult for barristers in different chambers to
agree to a division before the brief is returned. The brief's return is often more unex-
pected than the Bar seems to envision. Yet, if it works, such an arrangement may carry
the advantage of encouraging the first barrister to share his preparation with the re-
placement if he must convince the second of the value of his contribution to the de-
fense.
77. The new scheme, however, does depress the advocate's interest in preparing in
one way. Now compensated for each page of evidence the Crown intends to introduce,
the barrister will no doubt peruse the materials the Crown announces are part of its
case. But the barrister receives no special payment for reading unused material. Un-
used materials are those the prosecution has collected-statements and physical evi-
dence-but will not use. Might it follow that barristers will not inspect unused material
carefully, to learn whether there is anything that might undermine the Crown's evi-
dence or support the defense? More likely, leaders will expect the junior to search the
unused materials for gems, and ignore anything that the junior did not think was of
potential use.
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ciency because the advocate will internalize the cost of the time
he takes.
The laudatory monitoring goals of the ex-post facto scheme
must now be achieved by ways apart from the mechanisms of the
payment system. It is possible, of course, that the incentives
under the ex-post facto scheme worked only marginally because
their implementation was often inconsistent, and perhaps not
even widely known among barristers. As noted in this Essay, vari-
ous facets of practice may explain as well, if not better, the re-
quest to be led, the cracked trial, and the other points consid-
ered. Moreover, other, arguably more powerful factors can be
trusted to achieve those two goals of efficiency and thorough
preparation. Those include judicial oversight;78 the advocate's
self-interest in maximizing his hourly return and the insistence
by the members of the defense team that each performs his role.
Another factor is the barrister's interest in pleasing the solicitor
(and the defendant), given the solicitor's power to fire the bar-
rister in the particular case or damage his reputation among
other solicitors tempted to brief him.
It is unknown whether the problems that might arise by
eliminating certain incentives under the ex-post facto scheme-
trials become longer,79 fewer cases are adjudicated by plea, ju-
niors ask to be led more frequently, or barristers prepare less
and leaders delegate more work to others on the defense team-
have contributed to the Lord Chancellor's current intention to
implement additional changes (contracting with solicitors, a
public defender, lowering fees per category of case, reducing the
availability of Queen's Counsel). Whatever the answer, as the
Lord Chancellor seemed to ignore the incentives created by the
ex-post facto system in adopting the graduated fee scheme, so in
the White Paper and other documents he fails publicly to in-
clude any rigorous discussion of how incentives might be af-
fected. As but one example, with a system of contracting cases
with solicitors or barristers, the Lord Chancellor may discover
that one of the advantages of the ex-postfacto scheme-barristers
were well prepared-is imperiled as advocates (barristers or so-
78. This will occur at three stages: during pretrial hearings designed to learn
whether the defendant will plead guilty or how to narrow the issues at trial; at trial by
comments intended to goad the advocate to act more quickly or effectively; and on
appeal when the defendant claims the advocate committed reversible error.
79. Anecdotal evidence suggests the length of trials has not increased.
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licitors) internalize all of the costs of preparation,"° and that the
problems endemic in the United States-especially the pressure
by the lawyer on the client to plead guilty-grow.
Lawyers will appreciate how much more complicated the ex-
post facto scheme was than that used in federal prosecutions,
wherein defending lawyers are paid an amount per hour, for
preparation and for advocacy, with a cap on the overall
amount.8' The ex-postfacto scheme, as well as, to a lesser degree,
the graduated fee scheme, contained features designed, as the
federal fee scheme does not, to encourage effective and efficient
advocacy, in light both of the much more complicated system of
divided representation in Crown Court and of the greater will-
ingness to remunerate barristers handsomely under legal aid.
Nonetheless, this study of the two compensatory regimes reveals
that problems can arise in representing the defendant so that,
even if barristers are able advocates, the representation may not
be as thorough and effective as certain observers have con-
tended.8 2 Moreover, if the Lord Chancellor's proposals for
more change are implemented, the fees in the more serious
cases will drop. The chasm that currently exists between the
compensation a lawyer would receive in federal court for a four-
day robbery trial and that received for the same case by barristers
under the graduated fee scheme (and especially the ex-postfacto
one) will narrow. 3 That done, it will be interesting to return in
a few years to gauge the effect of these changes on the perform-
ance of barristers, their effectiveness and efficiency.
80. A study observing the effect of changing to a pre-determined fee for all work in
magistrates' courts concluded that solicitors were preparing less, and thus might be
providing "an inferior product." ALASTAIR GRAY ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STAN-
DARD FEES IN MAGISTRATES' COURT CRIMINAL CASES 15 (1999).
81. For a comparison of the federal and ex-postfacto fee schemes, see Tague, supra
note 1. The set amounts paid by category of case under the graduated fee scheme
more closely resembles the approach in federal courts. The difference between the two
is that fees are higher in Crown Court.
82. Compare Warren Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training
and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHAMt L. REv. 227
(1973) (being excessively complimentary) with TAGUE, supra note 16, and Tague, supra
note 1 (discussing incentives and identifying problems).
83. Of course, recall that the gap in overall cost of defending an indigent defend-
ant between the two systems may remain wide because the defense cost in Crown Court
includes the solicitor's fee as well as the barrister's.
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